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The arrival of Latino immigrants to New Orleans after Katrina differs from other new destinations in three ways. First, the initiating event causing a new migration stream is clearly identified. Second, this new migration stream is not limited to one national-origin group but includes immigrants from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, South America, and even more distant countries. This diversity is due to the large internal migration of international migrants to New Orleans and the fact that many immigrant workers were recruited, often as guest workers. Third, the context of reception for all immigrants is similar owing to the intense labor demand. Given the similarity in the context of reception, it is other factors, in particular immigrant's social networks, legal status, and other sociodemographic characteristics, which account for much of the difference in their outcomes in their new destination. This article details how different Latino immigrant groups became incorporated into post-Katrina New Orleans. The findings deepen our knowledge of how economic changes, in this case a disaster, draw immigrants to new destinations and influence their incorporation into those communities.
Disasters and New Destinations
Mobility after a natural disaster is not unusual, but the arrival and settlement of new immigrants to a disaster-stricken area is not well understood (Morrow-Jones & Morrow-Jones, 1991) . This phenomenon occurred in Broward County, Florida after Hurricane Andrew struck in 1992. In 1990, 75% of the population was non-Hispanic White, but with an influx of Latinos from Mexico and the Caribbean, the White share of the population declined to 49.9% by 2005 (James- Johnson & Benedict, 2006) . Hurricane Andrew created an opportunity for Miami-Dade County's Latino residents to find relatively better housing in Broward County while they were flush with home insurance settlements (Englehardt, 2003) . In addition, many new Latino immigrants arrived to help rebuild some communities, particularly Homestead, Florida (Kilborn, 2000) . More generally, Pais and Elliott (2008) have found that the "recovery machines" that emerge after major hurricanes draw new Latino and Black residents in search of employment and affordable housing.
The most common draw for foreign-born Latino immigrants to new destinations in the southern United States is the area's rapid economic growth and industrial downsizing, not weather-related disaster recovery (Smith & Furuseth, 2006; Zúñiga, & Hernández-León, 2005) . Although Mexican immigrants have a long history of agricultural field work, their numbers are growing in hospitality, construction, and manufacturing, taking them to new regions of the United States (Hagan, 2004; Kochhar, 2005) . Booming cities employ migrants in hospitality services and construction, whereas manufacturers and agricultural processors have remained competitive by employing migrants at lower wages (Kandel & Cromartie, 2004; Suro & Singer, 2002) .
Although the aforementioned economic transformations develop slowly with longer term effects, disasters have concentrated and short-term impacts. Economic changes and disasters, however, are alike in that both stimulate spending, particularly in construction, and immigrants are a growing proportion of that labor force (Kochhar, 2006) . As the Gulf South's population grows and lives in more vulnerable coastal regions, the hurricane-related economic losses and subsequent infusions of money associated with rebuilding have mobilized a growing number of Latino "hurricane chasers"-the rapid-response, low-skilled labor force that emerges after hurricanes strike (Fussell, 2007 (Fussell, , 2009 Pais & Elliott, 2008) . Although difficult to distinguish in a context of nationwide growth of the Latino population, hurricanes may in fact be one of several stimuli that draw immigrants to the Gulf Coast region and concentrate them in specific areas.
Several factors play into the emergence and growth of a migration stream, in particular, labor demand and the feasibility of movement between one's origin and the new destination. The pioneers in the new destination incur the highest costs, monetary and otherwise, in transportation,
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housing, employment, and the risks associated with an unfamiliar social terrain. As they gain a foothold, they recruit their relatives and friends by spreading the word about new opportunities. The social capital embedded in these networks facilitates additional migration and is thought to maximize earnings for those with high-quality networks (Boyd, 1989; Massey, 1999) . However, the strength and type of social capital varies depending on the immigrant's human capital; the conditions in the host community, particularly labor market demand, the characteristics of their ethnic community, and their legal status. These differences in social capital can therefore enhance or constrain immigrants' opportunities and are likely to be the cause of different outcomes among New Orleans's immigrants (Hagan, 1998; Menjivar, 2000) .
The Latino immigrants arriving in New Orleans after Katrina exposed a common phenomenon: they are often the first workers to respond to new demands for workers. This had the effect of raising both the proportion and absolute number of Latinos in New Orleans beyond preKatrina levels (Fussell, 2007) . Whereas other articles in this issue (Delp, Podolsky, & Aguilar, 2009; Vinck, Pham, Fletcher, & Stover, 2009; Weil, 2009 ) expose the exploitative conditions that immigrants labored under during this time, in this article I focus on the diversity within the Latino immigrant population and the differences in their migratory and labor experiences to understand how they produced this labor response.
Data and Methods
The data for this study are a sample of 42 male New Orleans immigrants interviewed between March and May of 2006 and a sample of 29 male Mexican immigrants interviewed in the United States in 2004 by the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) research team. Tulane University graduate and undergraduate students in the Latin American Studies Program contacted the New Orleans immigrants in churches, bars, and through neighborhood connections. The students were enrolled in my class on the Sociology of Migration, and I also did some of these interviews. The criterion for inclusion was that the immigrants had been in New Orleans for fewer than 5 years, and they were from Latin America. In spring 2006, no one in New Orleans knew very much about the new Latino population, not even where they were living or their total numbers. Therefore, we chose to interview immigrants wherever we could find them and where they would feel comfortable answering our questions. This article compares this sample with the MMP's sample of Mexican immigrants in the United States whose names were provided to the MMP research team by their families and friends in their Mexican community of origin. The New Orleans sample includes immigrants regardless of national origin, whereas the MMP sample includes only Mexicans.
Although the results uncover general characteristics of this population, they are not necessarily representative of New Orleans's Latino immigrant population. In the months after the storm, there were no reliable statistics on the population in New Orleans in general. Over time, organizations produced total counts of the population, but these did not differentiate the population by sociodemographic characteristics (Gordon 2006a (Gordon , 2006b Nossiter, 2006; Simmons, 2006) . At the time of our field research, there was no sampling frame to carry out a statistically representative survey of Latino newcomers. Prior to the storm, New Orleans had a population that was two thirds Black, less than one third White, with small proportions of Asian and Hispanics. After the storm, the total population was cut in half, with now nearly equal proportions of Blacks and Whites (47% and 43%, respectively) and somewhat larger proportions of Asians (3.5%) and Hispanics (9.6%; U.S. Census, 2006) . The Louisiana Public Health Institute (2006) conducted a representative survey in August and September 2006, and found that the absolute numbers of Latinos in New Orleans and the surrounding parishes had grown, even while the total population had declined. We can therefore infer that the growth of Latinos is due to post-Katrina migrants.
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How Do New Orleans's Immigrants Differ From Other Immigrants in the United States?
New Orleans's new immigrants are largely self-selected from the Latino immigrant population residing in the United Sates or other countries according to their greater mobility MUCH and willingness to take risks to earn higher wages. On average, New Orleans's immigrants are younger and more likely to be single than those in the MMP (Table 1) , which is not unexpected given the highly mobile population of job seekers, many of whom arrived in traditional immigrant destinations with saturated labor markets. Furthermore, they are less embedded in an immigrant social network. None have parents who immigrated to the United States and only one half have siblings who have immigrated. In contrast, nearly 90% of the MMP immigrants have immigrant siblings. The New Orleans group also has fewer friends and acquaintances who have New Orleans's immigrants are newcomers not only to the city but also to the practice of migration. Most are on their first U.S. trip, whereas the MMP sample has more U.S. migration experience on average. (A trip, in the parlance of migration scholars, is defined as having entered the United States with the intention of seeking work or to accompany a migrant. It is not defined by the length of stay.) However, New Orleans was not typically the first destination for those arriving in the city; most had visited one or two other places before arriving there. As might be expected of newer migrants, the vast majority arrived without documentation.
Their reason for coming to New Orleans is well known: they came to find work cleaning up and rebuilding the city. Therefore, it is not surprising that New Orleans immigrants are largely employed in construction. Nationally, nearly one in five workers in construction is a foreign-born Latino (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007) . Their motives are also well-understood: they sought the higher wages and plentiful jobs offered in New Orleans. On average, immigrants in New Orleans reported weekly wages nearly $200 more than those reported by Mexican immigrants elsewhere. Furthermore, New Orleans immigrants were able to send a great deal more money home than immigrants elsewhere, presumably because their living expenses were much lower.
Clearly, low-skilled Latino immigrants are able to respond rapidly to a local surge in labor demand, whether caused by a disaster or economic growth. This rapid-response labor force is highly mobile, willing to take risks, is physically able, and highly sensitive to wage differentials between places. They constitute the leading edge of an immigrant stream to a new destination.
Are New Orleans's Post-Katrina Immigrants All the Same?
Mexicans constitute the largest proportion of the study's sample although Hondurans, Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Brazilians were also interviewed. Certainly, other foreign-born Latinos have arrived as well, but they did not appear in our sample. New Orleans has historically strong ties with Latin America and the Caribbean. However, as New Orleans port became less important in the latter half of the 20th century, the city became less attractive to Caribbean and Latin American immigrants. Most Latino immigrants in New Orleans before the hurricane were from Honduras, Guatemala, Cuba, and Nicaragua (Henao, 1982; U.S. Census 2000) . During the 1990s, Mexicans began arriving in New Orleans, as they did throughout the South, but their presence was largely overshadowed by the Central Americans who had already settled there (Bracken, 1992; Henao, 1982) .
The sizable Honduran community, dating back to the 1920s, helps explain the large contingent of Honduran newcomers. In the past, New Orleans has been referred to as the second largest Honduran city in the world after Tegucigalpa, although today Honduran populations in Miami and Los Angeles have surpassed that of New Orleans. Hondurans throughout the United States and Honduras were drawn to New Orleans after Katrina to help out their relatives and paisanos, as well as to find work. Brazilians arriving in New Orleans by way of Boston are another large and unanticipated share of Latino newcomers (Gibson, 2008) . Because Brazilians and other Latinos speak distinct languages, Brazilians' access to Latino social networks and resources is more constrained. The arrival of Mexican immigrants was most predictable because they dominate the low-skilled, foreign-born labor force. Furthermore, their social networks are well greased. These three groups-Mexicans, Hondurans, and Brazilians-proved to be quite different from one another. Because of the small number of respondents in our sample, I included other Central Americans with the Hondurans, and therefore examine differences between Brazilians, Central Americans, and Mexicans.
Mexicans and Brazilians share similar sociodemographic characteristics but differ from Central Americans. Mexicans and Brazilians report an average of 9 and 10 years of education, respectively, whereas Central Americans have an average of 7 years (Table 2) . Their higher level of human capital suggests a greater ability to manage the migration trip and life in the United States, perhaps without as much assistance from compatriots. An additional 2 or 3 years of education may offer Mexicans and Brazilians sufficient literacy and numeracy in their native languages to more readily acquire basic English skills. These average levels of education are still below the national average in the United States and, therefore, most of these migrants are likely to be confined to low-skill manual labor employment.
The age and marital status of the migrants point to differences in their life stages and family arrangements. The Mexican and Brazilian men tend to be younger and are much less likely to be married than the Central American immigrants. This is consistent with their weaker ties to their home communities whereas the Hondurans in particular may be more strongly tied to a Honduran community in New Orleans or elsewhere in the United States. This is reinforced by the statistics on ties to other immigrants. Fewer Mexican and Brazilians have siblings who are also immigrants than do Central Americans. Furthermore, Central Americans know more friends who have ever been to or are currently in the United States than do Mexicans or Brazilians. Thus, the 464
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types of networks that have drawn Mexican and Brazilians to New Orleans are less extensive than their Central American peers. The patterns of migration are similar for the Mexicans and Central Americans, but differ somewhat for the Brazilians. The Mexicans and Central Americans have typically been in the United States on their current trip for about 4 years, whereas the Brazilians have been in the country a little more than a year on average. Brazilian labor migration to the United States has a much shorter history and is concentrated in a few destinations. Nearly all the immigrants in the sample had been in at least one other locale before arriving in New Orleans. As noted previously, most of the Brazilians arrived from Boston. The Mexicans and Central Americans were more likely to have arrived from other places in the South, such as Houston and Dallas, Texas; Durham and Charlotte, North Carolina; and Laurel, Mississippi. These places have ample employment in construction and poultry and seafood processing, both occupations that concentrate Latino immigrants. Only 5.3% of Mexicans and 7.1% of Central Americans had legal documentation, whereas one third of the Brazilians did. The higher documentation rate among the Brazilians stems from the greater entry barriers they face owing to distance, although some reported that they had flown to Mexico and crossed over the border into the United States, just as Mexicans and Central Americans are likely to do.
Although nearly all New Orleans migrants in this study are employed in construction, they earn very different weekly wages, on average. The Brazilians earn the most, at $860 per week on average. This is likely because more are legally employed and because they tend to have more skilled positions. Mexicans earn the next highest average wages, nearly $650 per week on average. The Central Americans earn the least, at $551 per week. These differences are predicted by the strength of weak ties thesis, which suggests that those with weaker ties have access to more higher paying jobs than those without weak ties or whose social ties are mostly strong ties between family members. Central Americans' extensive family and locally based networks may limits their offer, prevent them access to higher paying jobs, and prevent them from working as many hours at paid work owing to family obligations. Some Central Americans may also be rebuilding relatives' homes, which could limit their available hours to work for pay. In contrast, the weak ties of the Brazilians and Mexicans give them a greater range of employment opportunities so they are better able to maximize earnings.
Immigrants' reasons for coming to New Orleans reveal important explanations for differences in the strength of their social ties (Table 3) . Nearly one third of Central Americans had lived in New Orleans before Katrina, although we restricted our sample to those who had arrived no earlier than 2000. These pre-Katrina residents were likely to have strong ties to the area. In contrast, only 10 % of the Brazilians and Mexicans were pre-Katrina residents. Mexicans and Brazilians were approximately twice as likely as Central Americans to have come to New Orleans because their friends found work there and convinced them to come as well, an example of the use of weak ties.
Patterns of residence and connections to employment are also a function of immigrant's social ties. Twice as many Central Americans as Mexicans or Brazilians live with their family (21% vs. 10%). Nevertheless, the vast majority of all three groups lives with work companions, friends, or in group quarters, all of which constitute weak ties. These coresidential weak ties, however, did not necessarily translate into assistance in finding employment. Among Central Americans, 42.9% found employment through a relative's recommendation, a strong tie. Nearly one half (47.4%) of Mexicans and 70% of Brazilians found employment through friends. Among Mexicans, 26.3% were employer contacts. Friends and employers constitute weaker ties than relatives.
Immigrants' social ties are likely to influence their expectations about how long they will stay in New Orleans. Central Americans' strong family ties, and perhaps to the city itself, translated into longer average expected stays. Central Americans expected to stay about 70 months Fussell 465 on average, whereas Brazilians planned to stay 61 months, and Mexicans only 45 months. Thus, it appears that Central American's stronger ties made them disinclined to seek better employment opportunities when the labor demand in New Orleans disappeared and also made them feel more integrated in the community. In contrast, Mexican and Brazilian immigrants have access to a greater range of employment options but also feel less tied to the place, and therefore better fit the model of a rapid-response labor force.
Discussion
Given the data limitations imposed by a postdisaster context, the patterns emerging from this research are remarkably robust and consistent with what the migration literature might lead us to expect about migrants in new destinations. New Orleans's recent immigrants are drawn selectively from the immigrant population within the United States and from other countries to form a rapid-response labor force. Not surprisingly, they are younger, with relatively fewer strong ties to immigrants already in the United States, and they have less migration experience and social capital overall than other U.S. immigrants. They were clearly drawn to New Orleans by the high wages offered in construction, as the city rebuilt following Hurricane Katrina. In this way, they are not so different from the growing numbers of Hispanic construction workers throughout the United States.
This rapid-response labor force encountered a similar context: nearly endless demand for labor in a context in which legal status was largely disregarded. From September 8 through November These executive orders sent a message that a free market for labor would prevail as New Orleans rebuilt. Therefore, the similar characteristics of the new immigrants coupled with the broadly similar context of reception meant that the most salient difference between groups was the presence or absence of a coethnic community. Hondurans and other Central Americans had a pre-Katrina social network New Orleans whereas most Brazilians and Mexicans did not.
These differences between national-origin groups are evident in the data, even with the very small sample sizes for each group. Central Americans are less like a rapid-response labor force than the Brazilians and Mexicans in that they are less mobile and more connected to established immigrants. Although nearly all the immigrants in the sample work in construction, the Central Americans earn far less than the other two groups, which likely stems from their reliance on strong ties that may constrain their behavior in several ways. These strong ties, for example, may oblige them to work in a smaller set of jobs, perhaps for pre-Katrina Latino employers, and it may prevent them from working more hours if they are also donating their labor to friends and relatives who are rebuilding their homes and businesses. On the other hand, the strong, local networks of the Central Americans may also integrate them into a community that provides them with emotional support and other nonmonetary benefits.
The mobile and weakly tied networks of the Brazilians and Mexicans create earnings advantages but also distance them from an established community in New Orleans. This was more likely the case in spring 2006, when the survey took place, than today or in the future. Social networks between Central Americans and Mexicans are likely to overlap increasingly as they spend time together at work and in the Mexican and Central American restaurants, bars, and stores that have sprung up throughout the city. It is less obvious how much the Brazilians will connect with the Latino community. This largely "invisible" immigrant group has begun putting down roots in New Orleans, but they may maintain a separate social network if there is no advantage in connecting with the other newcomers (Margolis, 2008) . Therefore, the Brazilian migrants may form a distinct migrant stream from the Spanish-speaking migrants, which would become evident in their earnings and other indicators of incorporation into the city.
The unanticipated natural experiment of Hurricane Katrina and the process of rebuilding demonstrate how critical the highly mobile, low-skilled migrant labor force is to coping with any surge in labor demand, whether it is a product of a disaster or an economic boom. The national economy would hardly be as robust without the flexibility and responsiveness of this labor force, which is as much a product of the country's immigration laws as it is of the inequality between nations.
However, the social networks that make this labor force so responsive to opportunities in new destinations also constrain it. In New Orleans, the similar context of reception in both labor demand and migration policy makes obvious the critical role of coethnic communities in shaping migrants' outcomes. One interpretation of the patterns found here is that the strong ties of the Central American migrants with their settled coethnics may have prevented them from taking the greatest advantage of the earnings opportunities in post-Katrina New Orleans, but they also strengthened the community at a moment of crisis. The weaker and more mobile ties of the Brazilians and Mexicans may have created greater earnings opportunities, but they also reinforced their practice of moving on to new destinations in search of better opportunities and more wages. Although some of the newcomers inevitably will settle in New Orleans, particularly if the demand for their labor is sustained and opportunities for citizenship are opened, a large share is likely to continue migrating. Whether Latino immigrants stay in New Orleans or
